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DISCLOSING THE WHITE KNIGHT-
WHEN DOES THE DUTY ARISE?
A tender offer is a limited public offer to a target corporation's share-
holders to purchase or exchange some or all of the target corporation's
securities at a premium over the prevailing market value.' Over the past
twenty-five years, the use of tender offers has become the method of choice
for effectuating a hostile takeover of a publicly held corporation. 2 A "raider,"
or unsolicited third party purchaser, typically launches a takeover attempt
by purchasing a small block of the target corporation's securities.' A raider
1. See Polinsky v. MCA Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983)). The common characteristics of a tender offer include a widespread
solicitation of public shareholders for a substantial percentage of the.issuer's securities and a
firm offer to purchase the shares at a premium over market value contingent only on the tender
of a fixed number of shares. Id. In addition, the offeror typically leaves the offer open for
only a limited time period, thus pressuring shareholders in making the tender decision. Id.
While the federal securities laws do not define the term "tender offer," the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) once proposed a two-tier definition. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349,
70,349-52 (1979) (proposed rule 14d-l(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act)). Under the first of the two independent tiers, a tender offer had to propose to purchase
or sell more than 5% of a class of securities from more than 10 persons within a 45-day period.
Id. at 70,350. The second tier required that an offer be made in a widespread manner at a
premium over market price of either 5% or $2 per share and not provide for negotiation of the
price and terms. Id. at 70,351. The SEC, however, apparently has retreated from its attempt to
define tender offer more precisely. See Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques:
Creeping Tender Offers, 39 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1095, 1101 n.36 (1982) (SEC apparently
returning to position that defining tender offer would unduly restrict flexibility needed to
respond to new forms of corporate takeover) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developments in
Corporate Takeovers]; SEC Reconsiders Rules on Tender Offers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1980, at
4, col. 1 (SEC dropping pursuit of either rule change or legislative revision to define tender
offer). See generally Note, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 908 (1980)
(general overview of definition of tender offer).
2. See Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 CoLum.
L. REV. 228, 228 (1984) (tender offer is method of choice for acquiring large corporations).
The number of cash tender offers involving corporations listed on a major stock exchange has
grown from 8 in 1960 to 123 in 1981. Id. at n.2; see 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967) (comments
of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., on increased use of cash tender offers in corporate takeovers);
Austin & Boucher, Tender Offer Update: 1982, 16 MERGERS & AcQUIsITIoNs 48, 48-49 (1982)
(statistical overview of tender offers issued in 1981-82).
3. See Note, Developments in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 1, at 1096-97 (description
of conventional multistep corporate takeovers); Greenwald, High Times for T. Boone Pickens,
TIME, March 4, 1985, at 52 (description of typical raider takeover). Raiders are opportunity
hunters who threaten the managements of undervalued corporations with tactics ranging from
large, speculative stock purchases to hostile tender offers. Toy, The Raiders, Bus. WK., March
4, 1985, at 80. An undervalued corporation is a corporation in which the liquidation value of
the company's assets exceeds the aggregate trading value in the company's stock. Id. at 83. The fear
of a takeover by a raider forces the management of an underperforming company to find ways to
deliver fuller stock value from the company's assets. Id. By first purchasing a block of the
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then makes an unsolicited tender offer for the number of shares sufficient
to obtain control of the target corporation. 4 By dealing directly with the
shareholders, a raider using a tender offer can avoid having to seek the
approval of the target corporation's management and thus may consummate
the acquisition more quickly than by engaging in traditional takeover meth-
ods.
5
A corporate takeover by a raider through the use of a hostile tender
offer often results in substantial changes in the target corporation's manage-
ment structure, policies, or operations. 6 Consequently, the managements of
target corporations have developed a variety of techniques to resist hostile
tender offers.7 By employing defensive tactics, the management of a target
target's securities, a raider obtains a bargaining position with the target's management, dissuades
others from bidding for the target corporation, and tests the market in the target's securities to
determine the proper pricing of a subsequent tender offer. Note, Developments in Corporate
Takeovers, supra note 1, at 1097 n.10. If the raider purchases more than 5% of the target
corporation's securities, federal securities laws requires disclosure of the purchase to the SEC
and target corporation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982)
(anyone acquiring beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any registered corporation's
securities must file public disclosure statement). Thus, the raider calls attention to the under-
valued company and may profit from the increased market value of the target's shares, even if
the raider fails to acquire the company. Toy, supra, at 83.
4. Comment, Antitakeover Maneuvers: Developments in Defense Tactics and Target
Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. L.J. 617, 618 n.5 (1981). A raider may attempt to acquire
a target corporation for numerous reasons. Id. at 617-18. For example, a raider may desire a
merger because acquisition of the target corporation may improve the raider's overall earnings
position or secure a captive supplier of goods needed for the raider's own productivity. Id.
Any corporate acquisition usually involves numerous stages or steps. See 3 A. BROMBERG
& L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODrIES FRAUD § 7.4(4)(b), at 173 (1982). First,
corporate management typically expresses a desire to merge and perhaps receives limited
authorization to proceed by the corporation's board of directors. Id. Next, management begins
a preliminary investigation and analysis of the potential target. Id. Following an initial valuation
of the target, the acquiring corporation may open negotiations with the target. Id. The next
step is an agreement in principle by the executives of the two corporations fixing the terms of
the acquisition. Id. After the parties sign a formal agreement, the corporations submit the plan
to their shareholders for approval. Id. Finally, the corporations implement the acquisition. Id.
A tender offer typically skips the shareholder approval stage because corporate ownership
effectively changes hands when the tender offeror acquires a controlling interest in the target.
Id. at 173 n.140. In addition, hostile tender offers generally bypass the negotiation stage as well
as the agreement in principle and formal agreement stages.
5. See Note, supra note 2, at 228 n.3 (crucial advantage of tender offers over conventional
acquisitions and proxy contests is speed of consummation); see also supra note 4 (hostile tender
offers usually skip negotiation, agreement in principle, formal agreement, and shareholder
approval stages of typical corporate acquisition).
6. Comment, supra note 4, at 618 (corporate management must be concerned with
takeover laws and options available in responding to hostile tender offers).
7. Id. Common defensive tactics employed by target corporations in resisting hostile
takeover attempts include shark repellants, poison pills, scorched earth policies, and white
knight mergers. See Them's Fightin' Words, TIME, March 4, 1985, at 55. Shark repellants are
any measures taken by a target corporation to make it more difficult for a raider to gain
control. Id. A typical shark repellant is a charter and bylaw provision requiring a 70% to 80%
[Vol. 42:10451046
DISCLOSING THE WHITE KNIGHT
corporation ideally seeks to force the raider to withdraw the tender offer. 8
Alternatively, a target corporation may hope to defeat the tender offer or to
trigger a bidding war to improve the terms of any eventual takeover. 9 In
contrast, the raider making the tender offer and the shareholders of a target
corporation often oppose the management's use of defensive tactics and may
have a cause of action against the management for improperly resisting the
hostile tender offer, especially when a higher offering price for the shares
fails to develop.' 0
One of the most popular and effective defensive techniques a target
corporation can use when faced with a hostile tender offer is the solicitation
of a takeover offer from a friendly third party, or "white knight."" A white
knight merger can enable a target corporation to continue its operations in
a relatively independent fashion under more favorable terms and working
relationships because the target corporation is choosing the merger partner.
12
In addition, even if the hostile tender offer eventually succeeds, the use of a
white knight might secure a higher offering price for the target corporation's
supermajority shareholder approval of acquisitions not favored by management. Id. Poison
pills are devices, such as securities held by the shareholders of the target corporation, which
automatically convert to cash if a hostile takeover attempt succeeds, that make successful
takeovers more expensive for the raider. Id. A scorched earth policy is an attempt by the target
corporation to make itself less attractive for a takeover by measures such as selling off the
corporation's most valued assets. Id. A white knight merger occurs when the target corporation
agrees to merge with a friendly third party on better terms than the raider would provide to
avoid having the raider obtain control. Id.; see infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text
(description of white knight mergers). Ultimately, a corporation's best defense is a high stock
price and satisfied shareholders nurtured by a strong management team and shareholder relations
program. Toy, supra note 3, at 89. See generally Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) (analysis of propriety under business judgment rule of
common defensive tactics); Comment, supra note 4, at 619-32 (overview of target corporations'
common defense techniques to avoid hostile takeovers).
8. See Comment, supra note 4, at 629-30. (description of corporations' general purposes
for using white knight merger).
9. See id.
10. See Note, supra note 2, at 229-30. Raiders and shareholders who oppose a target
corporation's use of defensive tactics in resisting a hostile takeover use federal securities laws
and state fiduciary duty laws to seek injunctive relief against the target's management. Id. The
dissenting shareholders typically assert that by resisting a raider's attempt to buy out a
corporation's shareholders at a premium, the management of the target corporation is acting
contrary to the fundamental tenet of corporate law that corporations exist primarily to maximize
profits for shareholders. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, -, 170 N.W. 668,
684 (1919) (primary purpose for organization and operation of business corporations is to
provide profit to shareholders); see also Toy, supra note 3, at 81 (resisting premium takeover
offers is contrary to maximizing shareholders' interests).
11. See Comment, supra note 4, at 629 (corporate merger with friendly offeror is popular
defensive tactic against undesired takeovers by third party); see also Note, Tender Offer
Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 621 (1983) (white
knight merger highly effective defensive tactic).
12. See Comment, supra note 4, at 629 (description of typical purposes for solicitation of
white knight mergers in responding to hostile tender offers).
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securities by triggering competitive bidding between the raider and white
knight."
Knowledge that a target corporation is seeking a white knight merger is
of critical importance to both a raider and the target corporation's share-
holders.' 4 A raider obviously wants the hostile tender offer to succeed and
would like disclosure of white knight merger activities as early as possible in
order to prepare a prompt and effective response.' 5 The target corporation's
shareholders typically seek to maximize short-term profits by benefiting from
the highest premium over market value for their securities.1 6 Therefore, the
shareholders also may desire information concerning a potential white knight
merger before tendering securities to a raider during the limited tender offer
period. 7 On the other hand, both the target corporation and its white knight
typically desire to avoid premature disclosures that may jeopardize the
inchoate merger plans and mislead the investing public about a merger that
may never materialize.'
A target corporation voluntarily may choose to disclose information
concerning an attempt to arrange a white knight merger at any point during
the acquisition process.' 9 Nevertheless, a general duty to disclose material
corporate events to the investing public may force a target corporation into
an early disclosure of white knight merger activities.20 A more specific duty
13. See id. (soliciting white knight merger may trigger competitive bidding for target
corporation's securities).
14. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussion of reasons why knowledge
of white knight merger activities is important to raiders and target's shareholders); supra note
10 and accompanying text (raiders and other shareholders often oppose use of defensive tactics
by target corporation in resisting takeover attempts); see also Note, supra note 2, at 229 (raider
and shareholders may have interests opposed to target corporation's use of defensive tactics).
15. See Note, supra note 2, at 229 & n.7 (raider seeks to obtain benefits from target
corporation that led raider to make its tender offer). The earlier a raider discovers that a target
corporation's management intends to seek a white knight merger, the sooner the raider can
respond by seeking injunctive relief or by increasing the value of the hostile tender offer before
it expires. See id. at 229-30 (parties objecting to use of defensive tactics often seek judicial
remedies to constrain target corporation's actions).
16. Id. at 229 (shareholders of target corporation often seek quick profit of large premiums
over market value in tender offers).
17. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a), .14d-7(a) (1984). The SEC requires tender offers to
remain open for at least 20 days. Id. § 240.14e-l(a). The SEC also provides shareholders with
only limited rights to withdraw tendered shares. See id. § 240.14d-7(a) (shareholders tendering
securities may withdraw tenders during first 15 days of original offer and within 10 days from
commencement of another bidder's tender offer). Thus, shareholders would benefit from an
early disclosure of a possible white knight merger before making a potentially irreversible
decision to tender, since the white knight may be offering a higher premium.
18. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1984) (premature
disclosures of merger talks would have disruptive effect on stock market and might inhibit all
forms of corporate acquisitions), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Reiss v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (disclosure of uncertain merger negotiations
may be more misleading to shareholders than secrecy).
19. See supra note 4 (description of steps in typical acquisition process).
20. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing potential sources of duty to
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to disclose white knight merger activities could arise from several sources. 2'
First, corporations must comply with the formal disclosure requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
('34 Act).22 Corporations also may have to disclose white knight merger ac-
tivities to avoid liability under the general antifraud provisions of the '34 Act.
2 3
In addition, the major stock exchanges subject listed corporations to certain
disclosure policies.
24
disclose white knight merger activity). One additional source for a potential duty to disclose
white knight merger activities is state common law on fiduciary duty. See Note, supra note 2,
at 231-32 (analysis of limited use of state fiduciary duty law to restrict defensive conduct by
target corporations in responding to hostile tender offers).
21. See infra note 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing potential sources of duty to
disclose white knight merger activity).
22. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (1982)
(requiring certain disclosures in registration statements and prospectuses, including every material
contract not in ordinary course of corporation's business); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§
13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1982) (requiring periodic reports to Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and certain disclosures in proxy statements and tender offer materials, including
contracts to merge); see also infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (analysis of effectiveness
of formal disclosure requirements to force early disclosure of white knight merger activities).
The formal disclosure requirements for corporations most pertinent to white knight merger
situations include §§ 13 and 14 of the '34 Act and the rules adopted by the SEC to implement
those sections. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m-78n (1982); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 to .14f-1 (1984). Section 13 of the '34 Act requires corporations registered
under the '34 Act to file periodic reports with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13,
15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982). The rules promulgated pursuant to § 13 require registered corporations
to file annual, current, and quarterly reports. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, .13a-ll, .13a-13
(1984). For example, rule 13a-11 requires a registered corporation to file a current report on
Form 8-K within 15 days after the occurrence of certain specified corporate events. Id. §
240.13a-11. When corporate control changes in a registrant, Form 8-K discloses information
such as the identity of the person acquiring control, the basis of control, the date and description
of the transaction, and the amount and source of the consideration used in the transaction. Id.
§ 249.308. Section 14(d) of the '34 Act requires both the tender offeror and target corporation
to make certain disclosures concerning the tender offer. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). A target corporation must make two statements in response
to a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, .14e-2 (1984). First, under rule 14d-101, the
target corporation must file with the SEC a Schedule 14D-9 for the purpose of stating the
corporation's recommendation concerning the offer and its reasoning, and describing any
negotiations the target corporation is conducting in response. Id. § 240.14d-101. Second, the
target corporation also must distribute to its shareholders a statement indicating the target
corporation's management's position on the offer. Id. § 240.14e-2.
23. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1982)
(proscribing use of manipulation, misstatements, and omissions in connection with securities
transactions and tender offers); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984) (SEC rule implementing
§ 10(b)); infra note 38 (discussing breadth of rule lOb-5); infra notes 71-87 & 103-09 and
accompanying text (analysis of various disclosure duties generated by rule lOb-5).
24. See AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE §§ 401, 402, reprinted in 2 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,124A-B (June 29, 1983) (requiring immediate public disclosure of
material information with certain limited exceptions) [hereinafter cited AMEX GOaDE]; NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, A-18, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
23,121 (FEB. 11, 1981) (generally requiring prompt disclosure of all material corporate infor-
mation) [hereinafter cited as NYSE MANUAL]; see also notes 88-94 & 111-14 and accompanying
10491985]
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Relevant case law suggests analyzing a target corporation's duty to
disclose white knight merger activities under three common factual situa-
tions.25 One situation in which the duty to disclose clearly arises is when
formal disclosure requirements mandate certain disclosure filings or when
insider trading occurs. 26 In contrast, a target corporation apparently is under
no enforceable affirmative duty to disclose white knight merger activities in
the absence of insider trading, issuance of prior inaccurate or misleading
public statements, and stock market rumors affecting the trading activity in
the target's securities. 27 Between these two extremes, the point at which the
duty to disclose arises is unclear. 28 In addition, the proper form of disclosure,
especially when the target corporation is responding to stock market rumors,
is not clear. 29 Despite the lack of clarity in the parameters of the duty, raiders
and other shareholders are able to bring a cause of action against the target
corporation for breaching the duty to disclose white knight merger activities. 0
Raiders and the target corporation's shareholders generally base causes
of action for fraudulently failing to disclose white knight merger activities
on violations of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act and Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5.' While the '33 and '34 Acts provide express
remedies for violations of the formal disclosure requirements, the general
antifraud provisions in sections 10(b) and 14(e) provide more inclusive pro-
tection. 32 The formal disclosure requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts only
prohibit misstatements or omissions concerning material corporate informa-
text (analysis of timely disclosure policies of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American
Stock Exchange (AMEX)).
25. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (overview of common factual situations
in which issue of target corporation's duty to disclose white knight merger activities arises).
26. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (analysis of corporation's duty to disclose
white knight merger activity under formal disclosure rules of '33 and '34 Acts and rule lob-5
prohibition of insider trading).
27. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (analysis of duty to disclose white knight
merger activity in absence of insider trading, prior misstatements, and stock market rumors).
28. See infra notes 95-143 and accompanying text (analysis of duty to disclose white
knight merger activity when target corporation has issued public statements and when stock
market rumors affect trading activity in target's securities).
29. See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text (analysis of target corporation's various
duties when responding to stock market rumors).
30. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs
alleged that target corporation violated §§ 10(b) and 14(e) of '34 Act and rule lOb-5 by illegally
withholding material information concerning merger discussions with raider and white knight),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1201 (3d Cir. 1982)
(plaintiffs alleged that target corporation violated §§ 10(b) and 14(e) of '34 Act and rule lob-5
by fraudulently concealing white knight merger plans); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable
Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 728 (E.D. Va. 1980) (raider alleged that executives of target
corporation violated § 10(b) of '34 Act and rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose existence of
substantive white knight merger negotiations).
31. See supra note 30 (list of cases involving fraudulent failure to disclose white knight
merger activity).
32. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (comparison of items proscribed by
formal disclosure requirements and §§ 10(b) and 14(e)).
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tion in required SEC filings and reports.3 In contrast, sections 10(b) and
14(e) proscribe any form of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct
in connection with the sale or purchase of any security or tender offer.
3 4
Despite its similarity with section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, however, section 14(e)
may not provide standing for a nonstockholder raider to challenge the
nondisclosure.'s While neither section 10(b) nor section 14(e) expressly pro-
vides for a private cause of action for nondisclosure, courts generally have
implied a private right of action from section 10(b).36 However, the United
States Supreme Court explicitly has refused to imply a private cause of
action for damages from section 14(e) for a plaintiff suing in the capacity of
a defeated tender offeror.3 7 As a result, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 may
33. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(2) (1982)
(proscribing untruths and omissions by corporations of material information in registration
statements, prospectuses, and oral communications concerning offer or sale of securities);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982) (proscribing false or
misleading statements in all SEC filings, reports, or documents).
34. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1982)
(proscribing any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in purchase or sale of any
security or tender offer).
35. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussion of raider's standing problems
under § 14(e) of '34 Act); see also Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1316
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (§ 14(e) of '34 Act brings rule lOb-5 requirements into area of tender offers);
2 A. BROMBERO & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 4, § 6.3(211), at 116.7 (comparison of relationship
between § 14(e) and rule 10b-5).
36. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court in Bankers Life expressly recognized an implied private right
of action under section 10(b). Id.; see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800
(E.D. Pa.) (first court to imply private right of action from § 10(b) of '34 Act and rule lOb-5),
modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa 1947).
37. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (holding that plaintiff as
defeated tender offeror has no private right of action for damages under § 14(e)). In Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., a raider sued the target corporation's management, among others,
after the raider's takeover attempt failed. Id. at 4. The raider alleged that the defendants
violated § 14(e) and the '34 Act by allowing a white knight to obtain control of the target
corporation. See id. at 4-5 (asserting white knight gained control of target corporation because
of defendants' alleged securities laws violations). The Piper Court analyzed whether the-raider
had a cause of action for damages against the target corporation under § 14(e) on the theory
that antifraud violations by the target and white knight prevented the raider's hostile tender
offer from succeeding. Id. at 24-42. Noting that § 14(e) makes no explicit provision for a private
cause of action, the United States Supreme Court looked to legislative history and policy
considerations for support in implying a private cause of action. Id. at 25-42. The Piper Court
described the legislative purpose of the Williams Act, which added § 14(e) of the '34 Act, as
providing protection to shareholders who must decide how to respond to a tender offer. Id. at
35; see Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (adding §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-
(f) to the '34 Act). The Court noted that the raider as a defeated tender offeror was not within
the class protected by the Williams Act. 430 U.S. at 35, 37. The Piper Court also noted that
policy considerations weighed against implying a private right of action under § 14(e). Id. at
39-41. The Court asserted that the threat of an action for damages by a defeated tender offeror
would not provide significant additional protection to investors. Id. at 3940. Moreover, the
Court suggested that injunctive relief provides a more effective remedy than does a claim for
damages after the takeover battle. Id. at 40. Finally, the Court observed that the target
1985]
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provide shareholders with the broadest remedy when a target corporation
fails to disclose white knight merger activities. 8
In the context of nondisclosure of white knight merger activities, a
plaintiff must prove several key elements before a court will find that a
target corporation violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.3 9 First, a plaintiff
must prove that the target corporation's nondisclosure of white knight merger
activities while under a duty to disclose constitutes either the manipulation
or deception necessary for finding fraud under rule 10b-5. 40 A plaintiff also
must prove scienter before a court may find liability under rule lOb-5. 41 The
United States Supreme Court has defined scienter as an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. 42 In a nondisclosure case, a court can infer scienter
whenever the target corporation had actual knowledge of material informa-
tion and failed to disclose.4 3 In addition, a section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 cause
corporation's shareholders rather than the target's management and white knight would have
to bear the cost of satisfying any damages recovered by the raiders. Id. at 39. Accordingly, the
Court held that the raider, suing in its capacity as a defeated tender offeror, did not have
standing to sue for damages under § 14(e). Id. at 42. The Piper Court, however, limited its
holding to a defeated tender offeror suing for damages, thus suggesting that shareholder-
offerees and competing tender offerors may have an implied action under § 14(e) for injunctive
relief and under § 10(b) for damages for violations of the federal securities laws. Id. at 42 n.28;
see Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting
tender offeror standing to sue another corporation seeking to acquire target corporation for
injunctive relief). But see Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F. 2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that raider did not have standing to sue for damages under § 10(b), even though
raider was also shareholder of target corporation).
38. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (comparison of common statutory
grounds for claims alleging target corporation of fraudulently failing to disclose white knight
merger activities). Since the SEC adopted rule lOb-5 in 1942, the scope of the rule has broadened
to encompass a variety of fraudulent activity. SODERQUIST, SECURITIaS REGULATION 531-32
(1982). As a catch-all provision, rule lob-5 has risen to the preeeminent position among the
antifraud provisions in the '33 and '34 Acts. Id.
39. See American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741-47 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (explicit application of each requisite element in § 10(b) nondisclosure action);
Bromberg, lob-5 Liabilities for Non-Disclosure, 1 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES LAWS DISCLOSURE
225, 246-52 (P.L.I. 1976) (general discussion of elements in rule lOb-5 nondisclosure cases); see
also infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (overview of key elements in rule lOb-5 non-
disclosure cases).
40. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74, 475 n.15 (1977) (Court
refused to find rule lOb-5 violation when corporate management's conduct did not constitute
deception or manipulation); see also Bauman, Rule lob-5 and the Corporation's Affirnative
Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935, 943-45 (1979) (failure to disclose information when under
duty to disclose constitutes both manipulation and deception under rule lOb-5).
41. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (plaintiff must prove
scienter to recover damages for breach of duty to disclose under rule lOb-5). See generally
Allen, The Disclosure Obligation of Publicly Held Corporations in the Absence of Insider
Trading, 25 MERCER L. REv. 479, 484-87 (1974) (discussion of scienter requirement prior to
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder); Bauman, supra note 40, at 960-62 (overview of scienter
requirement in rule lOb-5 claims in terms of requisite standard of management's conduct).
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
43. See Allen, supra note 41, at 485 (scienter established if plaintiff proves defendant
knew material facts were misstated or omitted from public statements); Bauman, supra note
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of action requires a plaintiff to show a connection between the fraudulent
conduct and the securities transaction." The "in connection with" element
encompasses the notions of causation and reliance required in a common-
law fraud action.4 5 This requirement presents no problem for a plaintiff
asserting that a target corporation fraudulently failed to disclose white knight
merger activity because the Supreme Court, realizing the impossibility of
proving reliance on information never disclosed, allows a presumption of
causation in nondisclosure cases if the information withheld is material.
4 6
Materiality is the most important element that a plaintiff must prove in
claiming that a target corporation fraudulently failed to disclose white knight
merger activities.4 7 A target corporation is not liable under rule lob-5 unless
the undisclosed information was material.4 s The United States Supreme Court
held in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. 49 that undisclosed information is
material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable shareholder would
40, at 961 (courts should infer scienter in duty to disclose cases when corporation had knowledge
of materiality of information and did not disclose).
44. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (§ 10(b)
requires deceptive practice to touch sale or purchase of securities); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d
1022, 1027 (3d Cir.) (dictum) (in connection with requirement does not encompass all intra-
corporate management disputes which only tangentially relate to securities), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1977); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)
(proscribing use of manipulation and contrivances in connection with purchase or sale of
securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984) (SEC rule implementing § 10(b), proscribing fraud,
misstatements, and omissions in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
In addition to satisfying the in connection with requirement, a plaintiff must be a purchaser
or seller of the securities in order to establish a § 10(b) claim. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (recognizing buyer-seller requirement in § 10(b) actions).
In contrast to § 10(b), however, a § 14(e) action does not have a buyer-seller requirement.
Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (proscribing
fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers) with id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(proscribing fraudulent conduct in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
45. See Bauman, supra note 40, at 941 n.17 (noting relationship of causation and reliance
in discussion of in connection with requirement in rule lOb-5 nondisclosure cases).
46. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (withholding
material fact when under obligation to disclose constitutes causation in fact); see also TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 n.9 (1976) (dictum) (positive proof of reliance
unnecessary when plaintiff establishes materiality).
47. See Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and
Other Publicity Reexamination of a Continuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755, 757
(1982) (disclosure of corporate information is effectively useless without materiality requirement
because investors could not otherwise determine relevance of information supplied). See generally
Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977) (overview
of question of materiality in corporate disclosures).
48. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1984) (target corpo-
ration not liable under rule lOb-5 for failing to disclose white knight merger activities until
parties have reached agreement in principle on price and terms of merger), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1189 (1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (3d Cir. 1982) (analyzing
materiality of preliminary merger discussions); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1982)
(proscribes corporations from making untrue statements or omissions of material facts).
49. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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consider it important in making decisions concerning the securities involved. 0
Although TSC Industries involved false and misleading proxy statements in
violation of section 14(a) of the '34 Act, courts have applied the same
standard of materiality in rule lOb-5 actions.5 1 While the TSC Industries
Court set the requisite standard of materiality, whether information is
material depends upon the context in which the alleged cause of action
arose.'2
The importance of the factual context in determining materiality is
evident in cases which have analyzed when merger activities become material
enough to trigger a duty to disclose under federal securities laws." For
example, in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc.,'54 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the proposed conventional merger
activities involved were sufficiently material for rule lob-5 to prohibit insider
trading without full public disclosure, but not material enough to have been
50. See id. at 449.
51. See id. at 439-40 (plaintiff alleged defendant issued false and misleading proxy
statements); see also id. at 449 (omitted information is material if substantial likelihood exists
that reasonable shareholder would consider omitted information important in making proxy
voting decision). Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries v.
Northway, Inc., other courts have judged the materiality in rule lOb-5 nondisclosure cases by
considering whether a substantial likelihood exists that reasonable shareholders would consider
the omitted information important in making investment decisions. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying TSC Industries objective standard of
materiality in rule lOb-5 case), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.) (adopting TSC Industries definition of materiality), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 n.5 (2d Cir.
1978) (applying TSC Industries standard of materiality). The SEC apparently also has adopted
the TSC Industries objective standard of materiality. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1984) (defining
"material" in connection with information required in registration statements under '33 Act);
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1984) (defining "material" in connection with information required in
registration and reporting statements under '34 Act).
52. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (courts
cannot determine materiality in factual vacuum), aff'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); see also
Bauman, supra note 40, at 938 n. 11 (noting how SEC and courts have recognized that factual
context of case alters determination of materiality). See generally Hewitt, supra note 47, at 898
(changes in factual context of case may affect determination of whether particular fact is
material).
53. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir.
1976) (implying that target corporation's agreement in principle to merge with white knight was
not necessarily material information); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir.
1976) (information concerning potential merger deemed material enough to impose duty to
abstain from tipping, but not necessarily material enough for disclosure in SEC filings); see
also Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1975) (for closely held corporation,
preliminary discussions that established likelihood of subsequent merger deemed material
information to foreclose insider trading without disclosure); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301,
1307 (2d Cir. 1974) (negotiations reaching point in which merger was not remote possibility
deemed material information); Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,302 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (mere inquiries or contacts made by parties
interested in possible merger were not material), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980).
54. 531 F. 2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
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included in required SEC filings.55 When the corporate president in Geon
tipped a friend about a potential merger, the extent of the merger activities
consisted only of the exchange of some specially prepared financial reports
and a continuing expression of interest from the prospective merger partner.
5 6
In affirming the district court's finding that the president had improperly
disclosed the potential merger, 7 the Second Circuit indicated that the ma-
teriality of inside information depends on both the probability that the event
will occur and the anticipated impact of the event on the company. 58 The
factual context also was important in the determination of materiality by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Missouri Portland
Cement v. H.K. Porter Co.59 The Missouri Portland Cement court implied
that white knight merger activity can even reach the point of an agreement
in principle to merge without becoming material enough to require disclo-
sure. 60 The target corporation in Missouri Portland Cement accused the
raider of improperly making incomplete disclosure of the target's white
knight merger activity in the raider's hostile tender offer filings.6' After
questioning whether the raider was under a duty to disclose the terms of a
proposed merger to which the raider was not a party, the Eighth Circuit
analyzed whether the incomplete disclosure misled the target corporation's
shareholders. 62 The target corporation and white knight had reached an
agreement in principle to merge, subject only to certain standard conditions.
6
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit characterized the proposed white knight
merger plans as tentative and stated that parties are not required to disclose
contingent or indefinite plans.64 Thus, the Missouri Portland Cement court
implied that the lack of materiality in the target's proposed merger plans
vitiated any potential duty to disclose the white knight merger activities. 6s
A target corporation's duty to disclose white knight merger activities
clearly arises under both the specific formal disclosure requirements of the
55. Id. at 47-48.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Id. at 49.
58. Id. at 47 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
59. See 535 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court's decision that there
was not reasonable probability that raider's failure to disclose fully target's white knight merger
plans would mislead target's shareholders).
60. Id. at 398.
61. Id. at 391-92.
62. Id. at 397-98.
63. See id. at 398. In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter, the agreement in
principle to merge referred to a formal agreement that the merging companies would sign
conditioned on shareholder and director approval, the effectiveness of registration statement
filed with the SEC, the listing of the merged corporation securities on the NYSE, the absence
of materially adverse changes in either merging company, and a complete investigation of each
company's business. Id.
64. See id. (citing Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075,
1084-86 (5th Cir. 1970)).
65. See id. (concluding that reasonable probability existed that plaintiff would not prevail
on its contention that defendant's failure to disclose merger plans would mislead investors).
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'33 and '34 Acts and the rule lOb-5 prohibition of insider trading."6 Although
the duty to disclose is certain, the formal disclosure requirements often do
not force a target corporation into making timely or effective disclosures of
white knight merger activities. 67 For example, a target corporation typically
would not have to reveal a white knight merger pursuant to the periodic
reporting requirements of the '34 Act until fifteen days after the consum-
mation of the merger. 68 In addition, the use of boilerplate language by target
corporations reduces the effectiveness of the formal disclosures imposed by
the tender offer requirements. 69 Moreover, the combination of judicial
willingness to excuse noncompliance and remedies for violations typically
limited to curative disclosures further dilutes the effectiveness of a target
corporation's disclosure duties under the tender offer requirements. 7 The
parameters of the duty to disclose white knight merger activity when a target
corporation or corporate insiders are trading in the target's securities also
are reasonably clear. 71 The dispositive issue in most cases involving the duty
66. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir. 1982) (no question existed that
target corporation was under duty to disclose material corporate information during target's
stock repurchase tender offer); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp.
721, 742-44 (E.D. Va. 1980) (analyzing duty to disclose owed by corporate insider trading on
nonpublic information); Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j,
77aa (1982) (requiring certain disclosures in registration statements and prospectuses, including
every material contract not in ordinary course of corporation's business); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1982) (requiring periodic reports to SEC and
certain disclosures in proxy statements and tender offer materials, including contracts to merge).
67. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (examples of ineffectiveness of formal
disclosure requirements in forcing target corporations into early disclosure of white knight
merger activities).
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1984) (corporation must file Form 8-K current report
with SEC within 15 days after change in corporate control); see also supra note 22 (general
description of Form 8-K filing responsibilities under rule 13a-1i of '34 Act).
69. See supra note 22 (describing responses target corporation required to make under
tender offer regulations); see also Note, supra 2, at 231 & n.19 (target corporations seek to
minimize restrictions that federal securities laws impose on target's response to hostile tender
offers by artfully drafting required disclosures).
70. See Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d
Cir. 1969) (accepting less than full compliance with tender offer disclosure requirements by
suggesting that Congress did not intend to impose unrealistic requirements on corporations
involved in tender offers); Note, supra note 2, at 231 & nn.20-21 (effectiveness of tender offer
disclosure requirements weakened by judicial willingness to excuse noncompliance and by
curative disclosures being likely remedy for violations).
71. See American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 742-44 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (dictum) (careful analysis of duty of target corporation executives to abstain from
insider trading while engaging in undisclosed white knight merger negotiations). A target
corporation or corporate insider trading in the target's securities by using nonpublic information
is under a duty to disclose all material facts to the prospective purchaser or seller. See Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). The existence of a relationship providing access to
nonpublic information and the inherent unfairness of allowing a corporate insider or fiduciary
to take advantage of that information without disclosure establishes a rule lOb-5 violation. In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961); see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54
(1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
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to disclose before trading on inside information is the materiality of the
white knight merger plans under the given facts and circumstances.
72
In another common factual situation, a target corporation is under no
enforceable affirmative duty to disclose white knight merger activities in
cases involving no insider trading, issuance of prior inaccurate or misleading
public statements, and stock market rumors. 73 With the philosophy of full
disclosure permeating all federal securities laws, 74 a court may find a general
affirmative duty to disclose white knight mergers arising from the legislative
history and underlying policies of the '34 Act and rule lOb-5. 75 However, the
language of rule lOb-5 does not deal with nondisclosures aside from prohibit-
ing omissions of material facts when such omissions make previously dis-
closed information misleading. 76 Accordingly, as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Staffin v. Greenberg77 noted, no court
clearly has imposed an affirmative duty on a corporation to disclose all
72. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (2d Cir. 1982) (despite being under
duty to disclose while trading in its own securities, target corporation not liable under rule lOb-
5 because court deemed white knight merger activities immaterial); accord Thomas v. Duralite
Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1975) (shareholders in closely held corporation violated rule
lob-5 for inside trading without disclosing material information concerning possible merger
plans).
73. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (analysis of possible sources of general
affirmative duty to disclose white knight merger activities).
74. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (fundamental purpose
of '34 Act was to implement philosophy of full disclosure); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (full disclosure is foundation of '33 Act
and entire legislative scheme of federal securities laws). Congress designed the federal securities
laws to facilitate informed investment analyses and discriminating investment decisions by the
investing public by encouraging full disclosure of material corporate information. See 78 CONG.
Rac. 7704-05 (1934) (Congress indicated in debates concerning '34 Act that no investor can
safely trade securities without intelligent basis for forming judgment as to value of securities
investor is trading).
75. See Bauman, supra note 40, at 943-48 (general affirmative duty to disclose material
corporate information consistent with legislative history and underlying policies of '34 Act and
rule lOb-5); see also 78 CONG. REc. 7861-62 (1934) (Congress intends '34 Act to require
corporations registering stock on national securities exchanges to make full disclosure of all
facts that materially could affect listed securities).
The Supreme Court has indicated that in interpreting the federal securities laws courts
should first examine the language of the statute. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 472 (1977) (statutory interpretation of federal securities laws begins with language of
statute); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (same). Only if the statutory
language is not clear should a court then examine the legislative history and underlying policy
considerations. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 473, 476-77; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
201, 214 n.33.
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). Neither the first clause nor the third clause of rule
lob-5 deals explicitly with nondisclosures of material information. Id. Moreover, the second
clause of rule lOb-5 prohibits omissions of material facts only in the limited situation in which
omissions make previously disclosed information misleading. Id. One commentator argues that
the more specific reference to omissions in the second clause precludes interpreting the first or
third clauses to cover broader and more general omission cases. Sheffey, supra note 47, at 769.
77. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
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material corporate events in the absence of insider trading or prior inaccurate
disclosures. 78 In Staffin, the target corporation issued several press releases
during the struggle for corporate control by a raider. 79 After obtaining
control, the raider had the target corporation issue a tender offer to repur-
chase a portion of the target's shares to allow shareholders dissatisfied with
the new management to liquidate their interests in the target.80 The target
corporation subsequently merged with a white knight solicited by the target's
former management.8' After the merger, the shareholders who had sold their
shares back to the target corporation at a price lower than the price offered
by the white knight sued the target corporation. 82 The shareholders alleged
that the target corporation violated sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act
for failing to disclose the full extent of the white knight merger plans before
and after the target corporation's stock repurchase tender offer.83 The Staffin
court held that the target corporation had no general affirmative duty to
disclose the white knight merger activities prior to the time when the target
corporation began issuing the press releases. 84 The Staffin court also held
that a duty to disclose arose when the target corporation began trading in
its own securities during the stock repurchase tender offer. 8 The Third
Circuit, however, held as a matter of law that the merger plans were not
material enough to require disclosure.8 6 The Staffin court noted that disclo-
78. Id. at 1204; see Allen, supra note 41, at 488 (courts have been reluctant to impose
rule lOb-5 violations for total nondisclosure of material corporate events); Sheffey, supra note
47, at 762 (no consensus among commentators as to whether rule 10b-5 imposes general
affirmative duty to disclose).
79. 672 F.2d at 1199. In Staffin v. Greenberg, a raider slowly made open market purchases
of a target corporation's stock over a six year period. Id. at 1198. The target's management
decided to seek a white knight after the raider indicated in a Schedule 13D statement that the
raider may attempt to obtain control of the target. Id. at 1198-99; see supra note 3 (§ 13(d) of
'34 Act requires purchasers of 5% interest in single corporation to file disclosure statement).
Fearing that the target corporation might not find a white knight in time, the target's controlling
shareholder sold his shares at a substantial premium over market value to the raider in a
privately negotiated agreement. 672 F.2d at 1199. The target corporation issued press releases
to announce the sale of the controlling interest in the corporation to the raider. Id.
80. 672 F.2d at 1199. After the raider in Staffin refused to buy any additional shares, the
target issued a partial stock repurchase tender offer to allow dissenting shareholders to liquidate
their interests in the target. Id.
81. Id. at 1201.
82. Id. at 1198, 1201. The plaintiffs in Staffin sued the target corporation after the target
agreed to merge with a white knight at nearly $15 per share only a month after the plaintiffs
had sold some of their shares back to the target at $10 per share. Id.
83. Id. at 1203.
84. Id. at 1204. Until the target corporation chose to issue a public statement, the Staffin
court held that the target had no duty to disclose the raider's takeover attempt and the target's
search for a white knight. Id.
85. Id. at 1205. The Staffin court stated that there was no question that the target
corporation was under a duty to disclose material corporate information during the stock
repurchase tender offer. Id.
86. Id. at 1207. The Staffin court found no evidence that the target's white knight merger
negotiations had reached an agreement in principle to merge. Id. The court noted that target
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sure of merger activity before the merger plans ripen into an agreement in
principle may mislead investors into purchasing stock on the basis of
preliminary discussions preceding a merger which may never occur.
87
Another potential source of a general affirmative duty to disclose ma-
terial corporate information including white knight mergers are the timely
disclosure policies of the major stock exchanges.88 The rules of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
require listed companies to disclose promptly and fully any material infor-
mation that may affect the market in a company's securities.89 In the context
of white knight mergers, however, this affirmative duty to disclose is
ineffective and unenforceable. First, only a small percentage of all publicly
held companies list their securities on either exchange. 90 Also, both the NYSE
and the AMEX allow a company discretion to withhold disclosure tempo-
rarily when immediate disclosure would jeopardize legitimate corporate
objectives, or when the corporate information is subject to change and a
more appropriate time for disclosure is imminent. 9' Significantly, white
corporations do not have to disclose preliminary merger discussions. Id. at 1205-06. Accordingly,
the.Staffin court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Id. at 1207.
87. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in Staffin that
disclosure of preliminary merger discussions may temporarily inflate the market value of a
target corporation's stock in reliance on a merger that may never occur. Id.; see Susquehanna
Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1970) (reason that
preliminary merger discussions are immaterial is that premature disclosure may be misleading).
The Staffin court refused to state the circumstances in which a court may find a target
corporation liable under rule lOb-5 for failing to disclose merger negotiations which have not
reached an agreement in principle. 672 F.2d at 1207. The Staffin court asserted that withholding
disclosure of merger negotiations until an agreement in principle is reached strikes the best
balance between the interests of the target corporation and investing public. 672 F.2d at 1207;
see AMEX GuIrE, supra note 2, at 23,124B (assuming maintenance of confidentiality, listed
company need not disclose merger negotiations before parties reach agreement in principle on
specific terms of the merger); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24, at 23,123 (in exercising judgment
as to timing of public release, managements of listed companies should weigh interests of listed
company and investing public).
88. See AMEX GurDE, supra note 24, at 23,124A (listed company required to make
immediate disclosure of all material corporate information); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24, at
23,121 (listed companies required to release promptly any information likely to affect market
of company's securities); see also Bauman, supra note 40, at 976-77 (discussion of stock
exchange rules as source of general affirmative duty to disclose all material corporate infor-
mation); Sheffey, supra note 47, at 757-60 (discussion of disclosure requirements for companies
listed on NYSE or AMEX, or on National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System for over-the-counter securities).
89. See AMEX GUIDE, supra note 24, at 23,124A (requiring immediate public disclosure
of material information with certain limited exceptions); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24, at
23,121 (generally requiring prompt disclosure of all material corporate information).
90. See Bauman, supra note 40, at 936-37 (number of companies listed on major stock
exchanges is only small fraction of publicly held corporations).
91. See AMEX GuiDE, supra note 24, at 23,124B (listed company may withhold material
information when immediate disclosure would harm company's ability to pursue valid corporate
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knight merger activities would qualify under either test.92 Moreover, the
exchanges' enforcement tools, which include placing a freeze on trading and
delisting a nondisclosing company's securities, provide no deterrence for a
target corporation seeking additional time to finalize a white knight merger
because the merger typically would result in the raider's securities replacing
the target's securities on the trading market. 9 In addition, even if a target
corporation did break the exchanges' timely disclosure requirements, an
investor would have difficulty in establishing a cause of action against the
target corporation because the exchanges' requirements may not meet the
criteria necessary to imply a private right of action under the federal securities
laws or under state law third party beneficiary contract principles.
94
The task of determining when the duty arises to disclose white knight
merger activities becomes more complex when market rumors begin to
circulate and to affect the trading activity in a target corporation's securities.
Generally, courts have held that a corporation is under no duty to respond
to any type of rumor not attributable to the corporation. 95 In contrast, the
objectives, or when corporate activity is in state of flux and more appropriate time for disclosure
in imminent); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24, at 23,123 (listed company can exercise judgment in
determining proper timing of disclosure when premature disclosure would harm listed company's
goals or provide helpful information to competitors).
92. See supra note 89 (both NYSE MANUAL and AMEX GUIDE use merger negotiations
as examples of valid reasons for temporarily withholding disclosure of corporate activities).
93. See Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule lob-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation
Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DENVER L.J. 369, 369 (1973) (because merger
would delist target corporation's securities, target corporation could avoid making unwanted
disclosure of white knight merger activities). But see Sheffey, supra note 47, at 760 n.23
(asserting that delisting securities to avoid making unwanted disclosures is unrealistic for most
listed companies).
94. See Bauman, supra note 40, at 977-88 (analysis of theories of liability for breach of
stock exchange disclosure requirements based on private implied rights of action under federal
securities laws). The stock exchange disclosure requirements may not qualify as a sufficient
substitute for SEC regulations in meeting the requirements for an implied private right of action
under the federal securities laws. Id. at 983-84; see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir.) (establishing criteria for recognizing implied right of action for
breach of certain stock exchange rules), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); see also Sheffey,
supra note 47, at 760 n.23 (Supreme Court not likely to imply private cause of action for breach
of stock exchange disclosure requirements). In trying to establish a third party beneficiary
contract claim, investors may have difficulty in proving that they were the intended beneficiary
of the listed company's contract with the stock exchange. See Bauman, supra note 40, at 986-
88 (analysis of theory of liability for violating exchanges' disclosure requirements premised on
state law third party beneficiary contract principles).
95. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir.
1981) (company has no duty to correct or verify market rumors unless those rumors are
attributable to company); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (securities laws do not require company to correct misstatements that
are not attributable to company); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (suggests that company need not respond to spreading rumors concerning any
activity of corporation), modified, 466 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
See generally Sheffey, supra note 47 (comprehensive analysis of corporation's responsibilities to
correct or respond to inaccurate publicly disseminated information concerning corporation).
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stock exchanges' timely disclosure requirements mandate a prompt and
explicit response to any rumor, even if the rumor is not attributable to the
listed company.9 6 In Staffin, one of the press releases issued by the target
corporation was in response to a dramatic increase in the trading activity of
the target corporation's securities. 97 By finding that the target corporation
was under no duty to make any disclosures about the white knight merger
activities prior to the issuance of the press releases or insider trading, the
Third Circuit in Staffin also implicity held that the target corporation had
no duty to respond to the rumors affecting the trading activity in the target's
securities. 9 The Third Circuit further elaborated the position it took in
Staffin by explicitly stating in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.99 that a target
corporation did not have a duty to disclose its white knight merger activities,
even though the NYSE requested the target corporation to respond to market
rumors.'00 Thus, the Staffin and Greenfield decisions suggest that a target
corporation is under no duty to respond to rumors not attributable to the
target concerning white knight merger activities.' 0
The reasoning of the Third Circuit in the Staffin and Greenfield decisions
also implies that a target corporation may respond voluntarily to market
rumors without making specific substantive disclosures concerning its white
knight merger activities. 0 2 The antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, however, impose several duties on corporations that choose to make
public statements. 13 As indicated by the United States Court of Appeals for
96. AMEX GUmE, supra note 24, at 11 23,124A-23,124B, NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24,
at 23,123.
97. Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1201 (3d Cir. 1982).
98. See id. at 1204 (target corporation had no duty to disclose takeover struggle or white
knight merger activities before target corporation chose to make public statement).
99. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984)
100. See id. at 759 (target corporation under no duty to respond to inquiry concerning
upswing in trading activity in target corporation's securities).
101. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 1984) (target corporation
had no duty to reply to stock exchange inquiries concerning market rumors affecting trading
activity in target's securities), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.
2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982) (target corporation had no duty to disclose white knight merger
activities prior to issuing public statements concerning raider obtaining control of target).
102. See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757-59 (no duty to disclose white knight merger activities
until parties reach agreement in principle); Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1204 (target corporation under
no duty to disclose white knight merger activities prior to issuing public statements). Because
the target corporation was under no duty to disclose the substance of its white knight merger
activities until the parties reached an agreement in principle, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Greenfield v. Heublein implied that the target corporation voluntarily
could respond to stock exchange inquiries without fully disclosing the extent of the merger
activities. See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757-59.
103. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1982)
(proscribing corporations from issuing public statements with misstatements or omissions of
material facts); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984) (SEC rule implementing § 10(b)); infra
notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing duties imposed by rule lOb-5 on corporations
issuing public statements).
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the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 10-4 rule lob-5 proscribes
corporations from issuing false statements of material fact, or incomplete
statements that mislead the investing public. 05 Other courts have noted that
a corporation also could commit a fraud by failing to correct a misleading
impression left by prior statements.' 6 Moreover, at least one federal district
court has stated that the duty to correct or revise prior statements lasts as
long as investors reasonably could rely on the statements. 0 7 Thus, in volun-
tarily responding to rumors concerning a possible white knight merger, a
target corporation may have to disclose the full extent of the merger activities
even though the target corporation would not otherwise have the duty to
disclose. ,08
Target corporations commonly make voluntary statements in response
to stock exchange inquiries concerning unusual trading activity in the target's
securities.0 9 These voluntary responses are an example of the nexus between
the target corporation's duty to disclose white knight mergers and duty not
to issue misleading statements. 10 In an attempt to enforce their respective
timely disclosure policies, both the NYSE and AMEX carefully monitor the
trading activity in listed securities to detect situations in which some investors
104. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
105. Id. at 862 (corporations violate rule lOb-5 if assertions made in manner reasonably
calculated to influence investing public convey false impression to public).
106. See SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (failure to disclose abandonment of
merger plans following public announcement of proposed merger violated rule lOb-5); Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dictum) (failure to correct misleading
impression left by prior statements can constitute fraud).
107. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (duty to correct or
revise prior statement exists so long as investing public reasonably could rely on statement),
rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
108. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 762 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) (target corporation may have duty not to issue misleading statements concerning
merger activities irrespective of whether agreement in principle to merge has been reached),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); see also supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text
(discussing duty not to mislead and duty to correct or revise imposed by rule lOb-5 on
corporations issuing public statement). Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Greenfield is even more
persuasive considing Judge Higginbotham also drafted the Third Circuit's decision in Staffin.
See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1198 (3d Cir. 1982).
109. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1984) (target
corporation issued no corporate development statement in response to NYSE inquiry concerning
increase in trading activity in target's securities), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Schlanger
v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (target corporation issued
no corporate development statement in response to NYSE inquiry concerning unusual fluctua-
tions in market price of target's securities); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp.,
493 F. Supp. 721, 736-37, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1980) (target corporation denied rumors of potential
white knight merger in press releases, oral representations, and contract warranty provision).
110. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing
target corporation's duty not to mislead when target not under duty to disclose white knight
merger activities), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
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are trading on information not generally known to the investing public."'
Sudden unexplained changes in the trading volume or price of securities may
indicate rumors or insider trading." 2 Accordingly, the exchange asks the
listed company to disclose any information that would explain the unusual
trading activity.' 3 When the listed company has no explanation for the
unusual trading, the company typically issues to the public a "no corporate
development" statement indicating that the company is aware of no corporate
development that would explain the activity in its securities." 4
Recent case law has not determined clearly whether a target corporation
violates rule lOb-5 by issuing a no corporate development statement or other
public response to rumors about a possible merger while simultaneously
engaging in undisclosed white knight merger activities.' The Third Circuit
in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.16 held that the target corporation's no
corporate development statement was not misleading when the target cor-
poration's management had no indication other than unusual trading activity
in the target's stock that someone had leaked information to the public
concerning the target's white knight merger activities." '7 The target corpora-
11. See AMEX GUIDE, supra note 24, at 23,124D; NYSE MANUAL, supra note 24, at
23,121. Both the AMEX and NYSE maintain a continuous market surveillance program. See
supra note 24. With the use of computers, the stock watch programs monitor the trading
activity of every listed security to detect large unexplained changes in trading volume and price.
Id. The effectiveness of the disclosure policies of the exchanges depends on the stock watch
programs. West, Timely Disclosure-The View From 11 Wall Street, 3 SEc. L. REv. 155, 155
(1971).
112. See AMEX GUDE, supra note 24, at 23,124D (unusual fluctuations in trading activity
in listed security may indicate trading on inside information or rumors); NYSE MANUAL, supra
note 24, at 23,121 (unusual trading activity in listed security may indicate that market is reflecting
selectively disclosed information or rumors).
113. See AMEX GUImE, supra note 24, at 23,124D (listed company requested to make
public disclosure when market appears to be reflecting undisclosed information); NYSE MANUAL,
supra note 24, at 23,121 (listed company requested to make public disclosure when market
appears to be reflecting undisclosed information).
114. Id.; see Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1984) (example
of typical no corporate development statement), cert. denied, S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
115. Compare Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 758-59 (holding that no corporate development
statement was not materially misleading), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985) and Staffin, 672
F.2d at 1204 (finding that target corporation's press releases were not false, misleading, or so
incomplete as to mislead) with Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 123, 132-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (substantial fact issues as to corporation's duty when responding to market
rumors precluded summary judgment in corporation's favor) and American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Equitable Gen. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 721, 747 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding target corporation and
officers liable under rule lob-5 for issuing false and misleading press releases in responding to
market rumors).
116. 742 F.2d 751 (1984).
117. Id. at 759. In Greenfield, the target corporation began seeking a white knight when
merger negotiations with another corporation started to deteriorate and the other corporation
threatened to attempt a hostile takeover attempt. Id. at 753-54. Prior to the consummation of
the white knight merger, the target corporation issued a no corporate development statement in
response to an inquiry from the NYSE concerning a dramatic increase in the trading activity of
the target's securities. Id. at 754.
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tion's no corporate development statement disavowed knowledge of any
reason that would explain the unusual stock trading activity." 8 The Third
Circuit suggested that the statement was not misleading because the white
knight merger had not reached an agreement in principle and thus was not
information a reasonable investor would consider important. 1 9 However, the
Greenfield court also noted that knowledge of the merger activities was
information the target corporation clearly knew could have explained the
unusual trading activity. 20 Nevertheless, because the target corporation had
no other indication that someone had breached the confidentiality of the
white knight merger plans, the Third Circuit held that the target corporation's
statement denying knowledge of any reason that would explain the stock
activity was not false, inaccurate, or misleading.'
2'
The dissent in Greenfield questioned the majority's finding that the
target corporation was not liable for issuing a no corporate development
statement while engaging in half-secret white knight merger negotiations.
2 2
The dissent asserted that the target corporation's duty not to mislead applied
to any public statement reasonably calculated to influence investors, irre-
spective of whether the information concerning the white knight merger was
material enough to otherwise trigger disclosure. 2a The dissent argued that
the Greenfield majority effectively used the absence of a general duty to
disclose to avoid recognizing that the target corporation had a duty not to
mislead the investing public and to update any public statement voluntarily
made.124 The dissent noted that the Third Circuit's decision suggested that
the target corporation's statement would have been false or misleading only
if the target corporation had known that someone had leaked information
concerning the white knight merger activities. 25 The dissent argued that in
judging whether the target corporation's statement was misleading, the proper
standard should be whether the target corporation had knowledge of infor-
118. Id. at 754, 758.
119. See id. at 756-57, 759. The Greenfield court held that the target corporation was
under no duty to disclose its white knight merger activities when the NYSE requested the no
corporate development statement because the merger negotiations were immaterial. Id. at 756-
57. The court considered an agreement in principle on the price and structure of a merger a
useful measure for determining when the merger activities have become material enough to
require disclosure. Id. at 757.
120. Id. at 759. The corporate executives of the target in Greenfield clearly understood
that knowledge of the target's white knight merger activities might have accounted for the
increased trading activity. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 760 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent in Greenfield stated that it
was false or misleading for a target corporation to issue a public statement disavowing knowledge
of any explanation for the unusual trading activity in the target's securities when the target
knew of information that might have accounted for trading activity. Id.
123. See id. at 762. The Greenfield dissent distinguished the duty not to mislead and the
duty to disclose as two separate duties imposed by rule lOb-5. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 763-64.
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mation that if leaked would explain the unusual trading activity. 12 6 Thus, the
Greenfield dissent concluded that given the majority's finding that the target
corporation had information that might have accounted for the unusual
trading activity and the existence of a possibility that someone could have
leaked such information, the statement that the target corporation was
unaware of any possible explanation for the unusual trading activity neces-
sarily violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-.' 2
Two federal district court decisions support the Greenfield dissent's
position that target corporations can issue, in response to rumors, public
statements which are so incomplete that the statements fraudulently mislead
investors.2 8 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Schlanger v. Four Phase Systems, Inc.'29 considered and rejected
the majority view in Greenfield that a target corporation's failure to acknowl-
edge the existence of white knight merger activity in responding to market
rumors was not a false or misleading statement.'30 In Schlanger, the target
corporation issued a standard no corporate development statement in re-
sponse to an NYSE inquiry, although the corporation was engaged in serious
merger negotiations.'' Finding that the target corporation knew of no other
fact apart from leaks about possible merger activity, which could have
explained the unusually heavy stock trading,'3 2 the Schlanger court held that
126. See id. The dissent in Greenfield argued that courts should not allow a target
corporation to falsely assure the public that no corporate changes had taken place when the
target knew potentially damaging information. Id. Noting the near impossibility of maintaining
confidentiality of merger plans until the parties reach an agreement in principle, the dissent
asserted that the no corporate development statement in Greenfield was misleading because the
target corporation knew about information that if leaked would have explained the increase in
the trading activity of the target's stock. Id.
127. Id. at 765.
128. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 132-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(substantial fact issues as to corporation's duty when responding to market rumors precluded
summary judgment in corporation's favor); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp.,
443 F. Supp. 721, 747 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding target corporation and officers liable under rule
lob-5 for issuing false and misleading press releases in responding to market rumors).
129. 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
130. Id. at 132. In Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York analyzed the federal district court decision in Greenfield
v. Heublein, Inc. Id.; see Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (holding target corporation was under no duty to disclose preliminary merger activities
until parties reach agreement in principle), aff'd, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984). The Schlanger
court asserted that the Greenfield court erred by failing to distinguish the duty not to mislead
from the general duty to disclose. 582 F. Supp. at 132.
131. 582 F. Supp. at 129. In Schlanger, a target corporation was engaging in serious
conventional merger negotiations when the NYSE requested the target to issue a no corporate
development statement in response to an unusual fluctuation in the market price of the target's
securities. Id. at 129-31. The market price of the target corporation's securities dropped after
the target issued a statement disavowing knowledge of any corporate developments which could
have affected the market in the target's stock. Id. at 129-30. The target corporation announced
eight days later that it had entered into a merger agreement with another company. Id. at 130.
132. Id. at 132-33.
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the evidence raised issues of fact regarding the target corporation's duty not
to mislead and the materiality of the merger negotiations.' Consequently,
the court denied the target corporation's motion for summary judgment.' 4
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in
American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp. 35 also supported
the position taken in the Greenfield dissent by holding the target corporation
liable under rule lOb-5 for material misrepresentations made in two press
releases.'3 6 In American General, as the momentum behind the raider's
takeover attempt waned, the target corporation nevertheless actively contin-
ued to solicit white knight merger offers. 17 At the time of the closing of a
stock repurchase agreement with the raider that liquidated the raider's
interest in the target, the target corporation's white knight merger activities
with at least two other companies had reached the point just short of
agreements in principle to merge.' 38 In signing the stock repurchase agree-
ment, the raider relied in part on two prior press releases.3 9 The first press
release failed to disclose the existence of any new merger negotiations and
the later press release characterized the merger activities as very preliminary
and exploratory. 40 The American General court noted that, regardless of
whether a duty to disclose the merger activities initially was present, rule
lOb-5 prohibited the corporation from making affirmative misrepresentations
in the course of consummating the stock repurchase. '14 Determining that
information about the white knight merger negotiations was material, the
court proceeded to find the press releases false and misleading. 42 Accord-
ingly, the court found the target corporation, the target's president, and two
directors liable for violating rule lOb-5.'
43
A target corporation's duty to disclose white knight merger activities
appears to vary under the three common factual situations. ' 4 A target
corporation clearly must disclose its white knight merger activities when
133. Id. at 135.
134. Id.
135. 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980).
136. Id. at 747. In American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the target corporation vicariously
liable for the § 10(b) violations of the target's officers. Id.
137. Id. at 732-33.
138. Id. at 736. After the failure of the raider's takeover attempt in American General,
the raider agreed to sell back to the target corporation the shares the raider had acquired. Id.
139. Id. at 744-45. In American General, the target corporation misrepresented the extent
of the target's merger activities in oral representations and press releases. Id.
140. Id. at 744.
141. Id. (citing First Va. Bankshares v. Renson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
142. Id. at 744-45.
143. Id. at 747.
144. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing target corporation's duty to
disclose white knight merger activities in three common factual situations).
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subject to the formal disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws 45
and when trading in the targets' own securities. 46 While the formal disclosure
requirements appear ineffective in forcing early disclosure, the rules never-
theless eventually force a target corporation into revealing information about
the white knight merger activities. 47 Another common factual situation
involves the target corporation's duty to disclose white knight merger activity
in the absence of insider trading, prior inaccurate or misleading public
statements, or stock market rumors.14' In this situation, a target corporation
is under no enforceable general affirmative duty to unveil the white knight
until the duty arises under the formal disclosure requirements.' 49 The final
common factual situation involves the target corporation's duty to disclose
white knight merger activities when issuing public statements, especially in
response to stock market rumors.' 0 If a target corporation voluntarily issues
a public statement, courts have not recognized consistently that the duty not
to mislead the investing public continues to apply and that this duty may
force a target corporation into indirectly disclosing the existence of potential
white knight merger activities.'
The Greenfield dissent and the district court decisions in Schlanger and
American General properly question whether a target corporation engaged
in white knight merger activities, not yet otherwise subject to full disclosure,
can issue no corporate development statements without violating rule lOb-
52.12 Case law indicates that a target corporation cannot issue any public
statement reasonably calculated to influence investors that is false, mislead-
ing, or so incomplete as to mislead. 5 3 Accordingly, courts should not allow
target corporations to hide behind no corporate development statements
while engaging in any significant white knight merger activities. Courts could
145. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of formal
disclosure requirements of '33 and '34 Acts in context of white knight mergers).
146. See supra notes 7 1-72 and accompanying text (discussing target corporation's duty to
disclose inside information such as white knight merger activities while trading target corpora-
tion's securities).
147. See supra note 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing ineffectiveness of formal
disclosure requirements).
148. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (discussing potential sources of general
affirmative duty to disclose white knight merger activities).
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 95-143 and accompanying text (discussing target corporation's duties
under rule lOb-5 when issuing public statements).
151. See supra notes 103-10 and 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing nexus between
target corporation's duty to disclose white knight merger activity and duty not to issue misleading
public statements).
152. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text (analyzing Greenfield dissent and
federal district court decisions in Schlanger and American General).
153. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (assertions by
corporations made in manner reasonably calculated to influence public violate rule lOb-5 if
assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
1985] 1067
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
strike the needed balance between the legitimate informational needs of
investors and the equally valid need of corporations to seek business objec-
tives with a modicum of secrecy by requiring target corporations engaged in
white knight merger activities to give either specific denials of incorrect




154. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1982) (one must balance
target's needs and public's needs in determining when duty arises for target corporations to
disclose white knight merger activities); NYSE MAIUAL, supra note 24, at 23,123 (weighing
fairness to both present and potential shareholders is helpful in determining proper timing of
disclosure of corporate developments). If a stock exchange requests a target corporation engaged
in white knight merger negotiations to respond to unusual trading activity, the target corporation
could protect the delicate nature of the negotiations and avoid misleading the investing public
by issuing specific denials of erroneous rumors or "no comment" replies to substantially correct
rumors. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 760 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) ("no comment" response carries no legal significance when target corporation is
under no legal obligation to respond to stock exchange inquiries), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985); AMEX GuurE, supra note 24, at 23,124A (proper response to erroneous rumors includes
denying rumor and setting forth sufficient facts to clarify misleading aspects).
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